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The Cloying Use of Unallotment: Curbing 
Executive Branch Appropriation Reductions 
During Fiscal Emergencies 
Tyler J. Siewert∗ 
 Money is the instrument of policy and policy affects the lives 
of citizens. The individual loses liberty in a real sense if that in-
strument is not subject to traditional constitutional constraints. 
—Justice Anthony Kennedy1 
 
On May 14, 2009, Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty 
signed the Omnibus Health and Human Services Bill, a major 
appropriations bill, into law.2 Because an appropriation is bind-
ing law,3 the Minnesota Constitution compelled the governor’s 
faithful execution of the bill’s spending authorizations.4 But the 
governor announced that he would not fully enforce the recent-
ly enacted laws due to a budgetary impasse.5 Despite his 
pledge, the legislature approved a revenue bill on the final day 
of its session, which secured adequate funding for the appropri-
ations.6 After the session ended, a gubernatorial veto of the 
 
∗  J.D. 2010, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2007, University 
of North Dakota. The author extends a special thanks to Galen Robinson and 
Kathleen Davis, and sends his gratitude to Professor David Schultz and the 
Staff and Editors of the Minnesota Law Review for their advice and comments 
on previous drafts. The author’s greatest appreciation extends to his family, 
friends, and Angela, for their unwavering encouragement and support. Copy-
right © 2011 by Tyler J. Siewert. 
 1. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 451 (1998) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). 
 2. See Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn. 2010). 
 3. See MINN. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
 4. See id. art. V, § 3. 
 5. See Letter from Tim Pawlenty, Minn. Governor, to Margaret Anderson 
Kelliher, Minn. Speaker of the House (May 14, 2009), available at http://www 
.governor.state.mn.us/stellent/groups/public/documents/web_content/prod009516 
.pdf. 
 6. Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 359. 
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revenue bill eliminated the appropriations’ necessary funding.7 
The State of Minnesota then faced a multibillion dollar deficit,8 
thus paving the way for the governor’s exercise of his “unallot-
ment” authority,9 allowing for the executive branch’s reduction 
of allotted appropriations to balance the state budget.10 
Nearly one year later, the Minnesota Supreme Court inval-
idated the governor’s unallotments for lack of an enacted bal-
anced budget.11 The ruling vacated merely one of the governor’s 
numerous appropriation reductions.12 Moreover, the court left a 
crucial question unaddressed—to what extent can a governor 
usurp the legislature’s constitutionally reserved appropriations 
power during fiscal emergencies? 
As a matter of public policy, the wisdom of discretionary 
unalloting has been polemic.13 Although the term unallotment 
is unique to Minnesota,14 the procedure is common—a substan-
tial majority of state legislatures delegate a similar power to 
their governors.15 As with Minnesota, economic crises in other 
states have precipitated unallotments and subsequent legal 
 
 7. See FISCAL ANALYSIS DEP’T, MINN. H.R., CHAPTER 179 (HF 2323/SF 
2074) CONF. COMM. REP. MAY 18, 2009—VETOED, H. 86-2323, 1st Sess., at 1 
(2009), available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/fiscal/files/tax09.pdf. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See MINN. MGMT. & BUDGET DEP’T, PROPOSED UNALLOTMENTS & 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS 1 (2009), available at http://www.mmb.state.mn.us/ 
doc/budget/unallotment/unallotment-2009.pdf. 
 10. See MINN. STAT. § 16A.152 subdiv. 4 (2008).  
 11. See Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 368. 
 12. See id. at 361; see also Monica Davey, Deal Follows All-Nighters in 
Minnesota, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2010, at A16, available at 2010 WL 10232030 
(stating that the legislature ratified most of the unallotments because little 
time remained in the legislative session to redraft the budget). 
 13. Compare Sandy Levinson, Newsnotes from Our “Little Laboratories of 
Experimentation,” BALKINIZATION (May 21, 2009, 7:44 AM), http://balkin 
.blogspot.com/2009/05/newsnotes-from-our-little-laboratories.html (equating Gov-
ernor Pawlenty’s unallotments to a “constitutional dictatorship”), with Press Re-
lease, Ams. for Tax Reform, Minnesota Supreme Court Decision: A Blow to 
Taxpayers (May 5, 2010), available at http://www.atr.org/minnesota-supreme 
-court-decision-blow-taxpayers-a4899# (commending Governor Pawlenty’s use 
of unallotment as an effective “budget-cutting tool”). 
 14. Unallotment derives from the executive branch’s reduction of alloted 
appropriations. See § 16A.152 subdiv. 4. The author uses the term broadly in 
this Note to refer to circumstances where the executive branch reduces appro-
priations, withholds appropriations, reduces an allotment of appropriations, or 
reduces public expenditures. An allotment reduction is unique from an appro-
priation reduction, yet the effect is the same when the result contravenes leg-
islative spending prerogatives.  
 15. See JAMES J. GOSLING, BUDGETARY POLITICS IN AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENTS 165–67 (1992). 
  
2011] THE CLOYING USE OF UNALLOTMENT 1073 
 
challenges.16 Compared to only nine states in a seven-year span 
ending in the mid-1980s,17 forty-eight states have addressed 
budget deficits for fiscal year 2010 alone.18 The majority of 
these states, as a result, either have experienced the repercus-
sions of unalloting or are bracing for the impact.19 Amid these 
pursuits lies an often unaddressed concern.20 The very nature 
of discretionary unallotment statutes is antithetical to the 
principle that legislatures, rather than the executive branch, 
determine appropriation levels for the administration of public 
programs and projects.21 
Accordingly, unalloting often results in a disastrous legal 
paradox. While governors are able to sustain balanced budgets, 
their usurpation of legislatively established policy overshadows 
these efforts. In addressing this predicament, this Note sets 
forth a model unallotment statute, which states should either 
adopt or employ as a reference when reforming their own laws. 
Part I introduces the importance of separation of powers in the 
budgetary process and the history of legal challenges to execu-
tive branch budget curtailments. Part II examines Governor 
Pawlenty’s appropriation reductions to analyze the temporal 
and constitutional limitations of unallotment statutes. Part III 
introduces a model unallotment statute, which draws from the 
strengths of the most legally sound unallotment laws. Specifi-
cally, this Note advocates that all unallotment laws should pre-
cisely articulate the time frame in which unalloting can occur 
and either cap unallotments at a minimal percentage or require 
uniform reductions across the state’s entire budget. 
 
 16. See, e.g., Folsom v. Wynn, 631 So. 2d 890, 891–92 (Ala. 1993) 
(per curiam). 
 17. David Lubecky, Comment, The Proposed Federal Balanced Budget 
Amendment: The Lesson from State Experience, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 563, 
572 (1986). 
 18. Elizabeth McNichol et al., Recession Continues to Batter State Budg-
ets; State Responses Could Slow Recovery, CENTER ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES, 6 (Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.cbpp.org/files/9-8-08sfp.pdf. 
 19. Actions and Proposals to Balance FY 2011 Budgets, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=19644 (last visited Oct. 16, 2010). 
 20. Jim Rossi, State Executive Lawmaking in Crisis, 56 DUKE L.J. 237, 
263 (2006) [hereinafter Rossi, Lawmaking in Crisis]. 
 21. See D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF 
DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 12 
(1991) (arguing that lawmakers should not “prevent their capacity to make 
policy” by delegating their appropriations power); Michael L. Buenger, Of 
Money and Judicial Independence: Can Inherent Powers Protect State Courts 
in Tough Fiscal Times?, 92 KY. L.J. 979, 1030 (2004) (“[T]he legislature itself 
cannot delegate critical spending matters to another branch of government.”). 
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I.  EVOLUTION OF UNALLOTMENT   
To establish social and policy objectives, legislatures ap-
propriate revenue for the administration of public programs 
and projects.22 State spending must adhere to either constitu-
tional or statutory balanced-budget provisions.23 To ensure fis-
cal responsibility, the executive branch often balances the 
budget with unallotment statutes.24 A state-court split exists as 
to whether legislatures can authorize executive branch unal-
lotments by abdicating the legislature’s constitutionally 
granted lawmaking power.25 The recession that began in late 
2008 heightened the necessity of unalloting26 and therefore ex-
acerbated this controversy. Part I introduces the legal and poli-
cy issues raised throughout the history of unallotment in the 
United States. 
A. STATE BUDGET PROCESS 
Constitutional and statutory criteria detail the budget-
making procedures in each state.27 Although these criteria de-
rive from both years of strenuous trial and error and through 
the growth of democracy,28 scholars, judges, and public officials 
alike have done more to muddy the roles rather than clarify the 
duties of the executive and legislative branches during this 
process.29 Accordingly, this section briefly introduces the legal 
 
 22. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1146–48 (4th 
ed. 2007). 
 23. Ronald Snell, Budget-Balance Requirement, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
TAXATION & TAX POLICY 27, 27 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005) (in-
dicating that all states except Vermont must balance their budget). 
 24. See GOSLING, supra note 15, at 165–66. 
 25. Compare, e.g., State v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 736 P.2d 1140 app. 
at 1143 (Alaska 1987) (per curiam) (stating that Alaska’s unallotment statute 
unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority), with, e.g., N.D. Council of 
Sch. Adm’rs v. Sinner, 458 N.W.2d 280, 285–86 (N.D. 1990) (holding that 
North Dakota’s unallotment statute does not unconstitutionally delegate legis-
lative authority). 
 26. See Actions and Proposals to Balance FY 2011 Budgets, supra note 19. 
 27. See generally W. Mark Crain & James C. Miller III, Budget Process 
and Spending Growth, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1021, 1024–34 (1990) (analyz-
ing state budget processes). 
 28. See Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and 
the Line Item Veto, 76 TUL. L. REV. 265, 320–31 (2001) (discussing how the 
evolution of budget making in England affected the Founding Fathers’ beliefs 
about control of the public purse and separation of powers).  
 29. Compare, e.g., Dan. T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration, 42 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1781 n.872 (2001) (“[S]tate legislatures have re-
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standards, public policies, and competing theories of budgetary 
control throughout the states. 
To establish a budget, governors first submit a prospective 
plan to the legislature by virtue of the executive branch’s first-
hand knowledge of the revenue necessary to administer gov-
ernment programs.30 The legislature, however, ultimately de-
cides both the budget’s social and policy objectives, and the ex-
tent of their funding.31 Indeed, forty-seven state constitutions 
explicitly protect this legislative prerogative known as the ap-
propriations process.32 This process is the legislature’s chief ve-
hicle for affecting policy change,33 despite the governor’s line-
item veto, which can annul appropriations if not overridden by 
a legislative supermajority.34 Once signed into law, the execu-
tive branch allots appropriations for expenditure35 and admin-
isters the budget in light of each appropriation’s purpose.36 
History confirms that this system is not an arbitrary set of 
legal standards, but rather a sophisticated creature, slowly ad-
vancing the interests of separation of powers over time.37 To 
prevent tyrannical decisionmaking, separation of powers devel-
oped to concentrate authority in several hands through a sys-
tem of checks and balances.38 This principle of governance 
 
sponsibility for balancing state budgets . . . .”), with, e.g., David Yassky, Note, 
A Two-Tiered Theory of Consolidation and Separation of Powers, 99 YALE L.J. 
431, 446 (1989) (“[T]he power to order budget cuts is an executive responsibili-
ty . . . .”). 
 30. See TODD DONOVAN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS: INSTITUTIONS 
& REFORM 313 (2010). 
 31. See id. at 267–69. 
 32. Richard D. Rosen, Funding “Non-Traditional” Military Operations: 
The Alluring Myth of a Presidential Power of the Purse, 155 MIL. L. REV. 1, 
134–39 (1998). 
 33. Michael L. Buenger, Friction by Design: The Necessary Contest of 
State Judicial Power and Legislative Policymaking, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 571, 
606 (2009). 
 34. See DONOVAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 314–15 (discussing various ve-
to powers). 
 35. GOSLING, supra note 15, at 10. 
 36. See, e.g., State ex rel. Meyer v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assess-
ment, 176 N.W.2d 920, 926 (Neb. 1970); State ex rel. McLeod v. McInnis, 295 
S.E.2d 633, 637 (S.C. 1982) (per curiam); THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 403–04 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that “the applica-
tion and disbursement of the public moneys in conformity to the general ap-
propriations of the legislature” is an executive duty). 
 37. See M. Blane Michael, The Power of History to Stir a Man’s Blood, 108 
W. VA. L. REV. 593, 601–02 (2006). 
 38. See, e.g., CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE 
SPIRIT OF LAWS 157 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., 1989) (1748); MELVIN 
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gradually evolved from societal England’s resentment of the 
King’s plenary taxing and spending domain.39 In the United 
States, such resentment was evident from statements by lead-
ing political and judicial figures such as James Madison40 and 
Justice Joseph Story that the legislature must control the ap-
propriations process because “otherwise, the executive would 
possess an unbounded power over the public purse [and] apply 
all its monied resources to his pleasure.”41 The legislature and 
executive’s struggle for control of the public purse is notor-
ious.42 This conflict compels enduring budgetary oversight by 
both branches of government. 
While many state judiciaries recognize that “the budget 
. . . is fundamentally a legislative matter,”43 scholars continue 
to acknowledge the burgeoning presence of the executive budg-
et movement.44 This dichotomy may grow as additional state 
courts view budgetary authority as a joint responsibility.45 Ac-
cording to the latter theory, the budget process bifurcates into 
 
RICHTER, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF MONTESQUIEU 93 (1977); George Wash-
ington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON 277, 305–07 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1892). 
 39. See, e.g., Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2, § 4 (Eng.), reprinted 
in ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 681, 682 (4th ed. 1886) (establishing 
Parliament’s duty to detail the value and purpose of “money for or to the use of 
the Crowne”); WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY 
ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 232 (Burt Franklin 2d ed. 1914) (re-
quiring the King to gather a representative body to impose taxes). 
 40. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 232–33 
(Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
 41. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 222 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1994) (1833). 
 42. See Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, How Successfully Can the States’ 
Item Veto Be Transferred to the President?, 75 GEO. L.J. 159, 184–85 (1986) 
(stating that because governors more often use item vetoes to accomplish polit-
ical aims than to reduce budgets, vetoes trigger numerous political battles and 
legislative challenges). 
 43. Legislative Research Comm’n ex rel. Prather v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 
907, 925 (Ky. 1984); see also Rateree v. Rockett, 852 F.2d 946, 950–51 (7th Cir. 
1988); State v. Dankworth, 672 P.2d 148, 151 n.4 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Da-
vis v. Moon, 289 P.2d 614, 617 (Idaho 1955); Daniel Feldman, Legislating or 
Litigating Public Policy Change: Gunmaker Tort Liability, 12 VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 140, 158 (2004). 
 44. ALLEN SCHICK, BUDGET INNOVATION IN THE STATES 14–25 (1971); Ri-
chard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1171, 1180–81 
(1993). 
 45. See, e.g., Tihonovich v. Williams, 582 P.2d 1051, 1053–55 (Colo. 1978); 
Bell v. Assessors of Cambridge, 28 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Mass. 1940); Campaign for 
Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 58 (N.Y. 2006); State ex rel. Wis. 
Senate v. Thompson, 424 N.W.2d 385, 395 (Wis. 1988). 
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distinct roles: the legislature enacts law through appropriations 
and the executive enforces those laws through its administra-
tive departments.46 This view denies the reality of the modern 
budgeting process. Instead, balanced-budget laws47 may actual-
ly commingle the legislative and executive budgetary obliga-
tions.  
B. BALANCING THE BUDGET THROUGH DELEGATION 
While the overwhelming majority of state constitutions ex-
plicitly enumerate separation of powers clauses,48 state courts 
often employ the doctrine with less impetus than the control-
ling text.49 State legislatures are, therefore, more willing to 
delegate control of appropriations levels to the executive 
branch. This section explains the policy behind this near-
universal practice and introduces the extent to which legisla-
tures may delegate its control over appropriations. 
Scholars question whether the legislature or the executive 
must balance their state’s budget both prior to its establish-
ment50 and subsequent to its enactment.51 Depending on the 
specific state, it could truly be the legislature, executive, both, 
or neither.52 Once the fiscal year commences, nevertheless, 
most legislatures have all but surrendered any purported re-
sponsibility to the executive branch through unallotment stat-
 
 46. See, e.g., Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 376 N.E.2d 1217, 1226 
(Mass. 1978). 
 47. Snell, supra note 23, at 27. 
 48. Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifed-
eralist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1190 
(1999) [hereinafter Rossi, Institutional Design]. 
 49. Kristien G. Knapp, Resolving the Presidential Signing Statement Con-
troversy, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 737, 768–70 (2008). 
 50. Compare James M. Poterba & Kim Rueben, State Fiscal Institutions 
and the U.S. Municipal Bond Market, in FISCAL INSTITUTIONS AND FISCAL 
PERFORMANCE 181, 191 (James M. Poterba & Jürgen von Hagen eds., 1999) 
(noting that the majority of legislatures must pass balanced budgets), with 
Bruce A. Wallin, Budget Processes, State, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION 
& TAX POLICY, supra note 23, at 37, 38 (arguing that governors are the chief 
“budget balancer[s]” because they submit balanced budgets to the legislatures). 
 51. Compare Yassky, supra note 29, at 446 (“[T]he power to order budget 
cuts is an executive responsibility . . . .”), with Michael Abramowicz, Beyond 
Balanced Budgets, Fourteenth Amendment Style, 33 TULSA L.J. 561, 609 
(1997) (“[R]ewriting a budget is a quintessentially legislative task . . . .”). 
 52. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/AFMD-93-58BR, BALANCED 
BUDGET REQUIREMENTS: STATE EXPERIENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 10–23 (1993). 
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utes.53 A respective governor’s authority to unallot varies 
across states54 but inherent in each statute is an underlying 
policy objective. One governor, rather than hundreds of often 
out-of-session legislators,55 has “the greater institutional moti-
vation and capacity for achieving fiscal restraint.”56 Despite 
this fact, the confines of each state’s nondelegation doctrine 
prohibit unbridled statutory delegation of legislative authority 
to the executive branch.57 
The doctrine, a legal cannon derived from John Locke’s The 
Second Treatise of Government,58 prevents the delegation of leg-
islative power without guiding standards.59 Each state’s judi-
ciary has developed its own nondelegation scheme rooted in 
common law.60 Evidence suggests that most state judiciaries 
establish nondelegation doctrines that fall between the border 
of “moderate” and “strong.”61 Specifically, twenty-three states 
require a clear “legislative statement of policy” to satisfy non-
delegation requirements while twenty other states demand 
“specific standards in legislation.”62 A mere seven states re-
quire a “procedural safeguard.”63 In practice, state courts find 
constitutional violations of the doctrine to a greater extent than 
the federal judiciary.64 Though state courts have scrutinized 
 
 53. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 37.07.080(g) (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 24-75-201.5(1)(a) (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 6529 (2010); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 45-12-86 (West 2010). 
 54. GOSLING, supra note 15, at 167. 
 55. See, e.g., Snell, supra note 23, at 28 (“[S]ome legislatures meet for only 
a few months every other year. Requiring legislative consent for every change 
in a budget would impose delays or the costs of special sessions.”). 
 56. See Briffault, supra note 44, at 1180. 
 57. See Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions and Constitutional Duels, 46 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1343, 1359–62 (2005) [hereinafter Rossi, Dual Constitutions]. 
 58. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 81 (Thomas P. 
Peardon ed., Liberal Arts Press 1952) (“[T]he legislative cannot transfer the 
power of making laws . . . for it being but a delegated power from the people . . . .”). 
 59. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 
(1928) (federal doctrine); Lee v. Delmont, 36 N.W.2d 530, 538 (Minn. 1949) 
(Minnesota doctrine). 
 60. Gary J. Greco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation 
Doctrine in the States, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 567, 578–601 (1994). 
 61. Rossi, Institutional Design, supra note 48, at 1193–200. 
 62. Id. at 1201. 
 63. Id. at 1191–93. 
 64. Id. at 1216–17.  
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executive branch appropriation reductions in light of the non-
delegation doctrine, their opinions often conflict.65 
C. STATE-COURT SPLIT OVER EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
APPROPRIATION REDUCTIONS 
Depending on respective statutory language, state judiciar-
ies have either upheld or overturned various acts of unalloting. 
Unallotments without statutory authorization, commonly 
known as impoundment, confront a higher magnitude of judi-
cial scrutiny but are not per se unconstitutional. This section 
aims to compartmentalize and clarify both valid and void ex-
ecutive branch unallotment decisions. 
1. Constitutional and Valid 
State courts have upheld the validity of executive branch 
appropriation changes in seven distinct areas: (1) where uni-
form cuts or percentage caps preserved legislative policy in-
tent,66 (2) where courts framed the delegation standard as one 
to prevent insolvency,67 (3) where courts upheld unallotment on 
procedural grounds,68 (4) where impoundment comported with 
 
 65. Compare, e.g., Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260, 265 
(Fla. 1991) (holding that the legislature may not delegate power to restructure 
appropriations), with, e.g., Judy v. Schaefer, 627 A.2d 1039, 1040 (Md. 1993) 
(holding that the legislature may delegate power to reduce appropriations). 
 66. See, e.g., Folsem v. Wynn, 631 So. 2d 890, 894–95 (Ala. 1993); Univ. of 
Conn. Chapter AAUP v. Governor, 512 A.2d 152, 158–59 (Conn. 1986); La. 
Ass’n of Planning & Dev. Dists. v. Treen, 435 So. 2d 1003, 1005–08 (La. Ct. 
App. 1983); Schaefer, 627 A.2d at 1052; Yelle v. Bishop, 347 P.2d 1081, 1090–
91 (Wash. 1959); see also N.D. Council of Sch. Adm’rs v. Sinner, 458 N.W.2d 
280, 284–86 (N.D. 1990) (upholding an unallotment statute that allowed uni-
form cuts only in limited circumstances). But see State ex rel. Holmes v. State 
Bd. of Fin., 367 P.2d 925, 926, 932–33 (N.M. 1961) (holding unallotment un-
constitutional because a percentage cap along with other exceptions did not 
provide a sufficient standard). 
 67. See, e.g., Roselli v. Noel, 414 F. Supp. 417, 424 (D.R.I. 1976); Legisla-
tive Research Comm’n ex rel. Prather v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 926 (Ky. 
1984); Bruneau v. Edwards, 517 So. 2d 818, 826 (La. Ct. App. 1987); New Eng. 
Div. of Am. Cancer Soc’y v. Comm’r of Admin., 769 N.E.2d 1248, 1257 (Mass. 
2002); Rukavina v. Pawlenty, 684 N.W.2d 525, 535 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); Bd. 
of Educ. v. Gilligan, 301 N.E.2d 911, 914 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973), aff’d on other 
grounds, 311 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 1974); Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 109 
S.E.2d 552, 559–60 (W. Va. 1959); see also Perth Amboy Bd. of Educ. v. Chris-
tie, 997 A.2d 262, 268–70 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (per curiam) (requir-
ing unallotments to conform to legislative intent). 
 68. See, e.g., Gilligan, 301 N.E.2d at 915. 
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legislative intent,69 (5) where unallotment statutes required 
further legislative approval,70 (6) where courts upheld unallot-
ments without adjudicating the merits of the constitutional 
question,71 and (7) where the executive branch transferred ap-
propriations within a department.72 The following paragraphs 
briefly discuss the former three methods in turn, as they best 
represent so-called emergency unallotments. 
Of the several jurisdictions upholding uniform or percent-
age-capped reductions, the court in University of Connecticut 
Chapter AAUP v. Governor73 advanced the clearest illustration 
of statutory compliance with the nondelegation doctrine. The 
court affirmed that unallotment statutes are constitutional 
where the text provides a temporal limit on when the executive 
may unallot, and provides a percentage limit on the extent to 
which the executive may do so.74 
Courts upholding the delegation of appropriation reduc-
tions have often done so on divergent grounds. The Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, for instance, framed the non-
delegation standard as one where the legislature delegates the 
capacity to prevent insolvency, rather than the power to over-
ride legislative policy priorities.75 A Louisiana appellate court, 
in contrast, enunciated its own standard, proclaiming that “[n]o 
restrictions, standards, or guidelines are required” for execu-
tive unalloting as long as it is to “avoid a deficit.”76 
 
 69. See, e.g., Rios v. Symington, 833 P.2d 20, 29 (Ariz. 1992) (holding im-
poundment as constitutional when “the legislative purpose of the appropria-
tion is carried out and funds remain”); Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 376 
N.E.2d 1217, 1222 (Mass. 1978) (“[A] refusal to expend funds for the purpose 
of amending or defeating legislative objectives is to be distinguished from the 
exercise of executive judgment that the full legislative objectives can be ac-
complished by a lesser expenditure of funds than appropriated.”). 
 70. See, e.g., Prather, 664 S.W.2d at 924; Hunter v. State, 865 A.2d 381, 
387, 392–96 (Vt. 2004). 
 71. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Waihee, 768 P.2d 1279, 1288 (Haw. 1989); see 
also Mich. Ass’n of Cntys. v. Dep’t of Mgmt. & Budget, 345 N.W.2d 584, 591–92 
(Mich. 1984) (citing MICH. CONST. art. V, § 20); Cnty. of Cabarrus v. Tolson, 610 
S.E.2d 443, 445–46 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (citing N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5(3)). 
 72. See, e.g., Bussie v. McKeithen, 259 So. 2d 345, 351–52 (La. Ct. App. 
1971); Advisory Op. in re Separation of Powers, 295 S.E.2d 589, 593–94 (N.C. 
1982). 
 73. 512 A.2d 152 (Conn. 1986). 
 74. See id. at 159. 
 75. See New Eng. Div. of Am. Cancer Soc’y v. Comm’r of Admin., 769 
N.E.2d 1248, 1257 (Mass. 2002). 
 76. Bruneau v. Edwards, 517 So. 2d 818, 826 (La. Ct. App. 1987). 
  
2011] THE CLOYING USE OF UNALLOTMENT 1081 
 
Although the preceding ensemble of cases upheld the facial 
constitutionality of unallotment statutes, a few courts have ad-
judicated their procedural scope. In Board of Education v. Gil-
ligan, an Ohio appellate court upheld former Governor John 
Gilligan’s application of Ohio’s unallotment statute.77 At the 
time Governor Gilligan instituted the unallotments, the legisla-
ture had yet to enact an appropriations bill or a final budget.78 
In defending the governor’s actions, the court dismissed the 
implicit requirement that the state must first enact a budget to 
unallot.79 While a number of courts have considered and con-
firmed the constitutionality of executive branch appropriation 
reductions, albeit on conflicting grounds, a commensurate 
number of courts have held otherwise. 
2. Unconstitutional and Void 
State courts have overturned executive changes of appro-
priations in four particular circumstances: (1) where discretion-
ary unallotments usurped legislative policy intent,80 (2) where 
the executive impounded appropriations,81 (3) where the execu-
tive failed to follow proper statutory procedures,82 and (4) 
where the executive transferred appropriations across depart-
 
 77. See Bd. of Educ. v. Gilligan, 301 N.E.2d 911, 915 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973), 
aff’d on other grounds, 311 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 1974). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See, e.g., State v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 736 P.2d 1140, 1142–43 
(Alaska 1987) (per curiam); Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 
260, 264–65 (Fla. 1991); Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 369–70 (Minn. 
2010) (Page, J., concurring); State Emps. Ass’n, Inc. v. Daines, 824 P.2d 276, 
279–80 (Nev. 1992) (per curiam); Commcn’s Workers v. Florio, 617 A.2d 223, 
234 (N.J. 1992) (“The Legislature properly has the power to reduce appropria-
tions for the operate of State government.”); State ex rel. Schwartz v. Johnson, 
907 P.2d 1001, 1008 (N.M. 1995); State ex rel. Hudson v. Carter, 27 P.2d 617, 
626 (Okla. 1933) (“The legislature is without authority of law to confer upon 
the governor the power to reduce . . . appropriation[s].”); see also Winter v. 
Barrett, 186 N.E. 113, 127 (Ill. 1933) (per curiam) (holding that the legislature 
determines the “objects and purposes” for appropriations and shall not dele-
gate this discretionary power). 
 81. See, e.g., W. Side Org. Health Servs. Corp. v. Thompson, 391 N.E.2d 
392, 402 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979), rev’d on grounds of mootness, 404 N.E.2d 208 (Ill. 
1980); Cnty. of Oneida v. Berle, 404 N.E.2d 133, 137 (N.Y. 1980) (per curiam); 
In re Advisory Op. to the House of Representatives, 576 A.2d 1371, 1373–74 
(R.I. 1990). 
 82. See, e.g., Etherton v. Wyatt, 293 N.E.2d 43, 50–51 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1973); Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 368; Gilstrap v. S.C. Budget & Control Bd., 423 
S.E.2d 101, 105 (S.C. 1992) (per curiam). 
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mental budgets.83 The following paragraphs briefly discuss the 
former three because they represent emergency unallotments 
within this context. 
A trio of state cases has offered corresponding justifications 
against an executive’s discretion to abate appropriations.84 The 
Florida Supreme Court held that constitutional unalloting 
could only exist where “legislative intent [to delegate the power 
to reduce appropriations] is clearly established and can be di-
rectly followed.”85 Taking the analysis one step further, the 
court in State v. Fairbanks North Star Borough concluded that 
unabridged unallotments constituted nothing more than a 
second veto power that the legislature could not override.86 The 
clearest articulation of these holdings, expressed by the New 
Mexico Supreme Court, is that the legislature cannot delegate 
“its policy-making responsibility”87 and allow the “discretionary 
fiscal policy” of the governor to take its place.88 Courts have 
overturned gubernatorial impoundments on parallel grounds. 
In County of Oneida v. Berle, former New York Governor 
Hugh Carey impounded appropriations to ensure that the 
state’s budget had a positive balance shortly after the fiscal 
year commenced.89 The court found the act unconstitutional be-
cause Governor Carey had a duty to “faithfully execute” the ap-
propriations he signed into law.90 The decision added to the no-
tion that governors may not inject their fiscal policy objectives 
into enacted appropriations.91 Instead, governors must first 
make a good faith effort to properly expend such appropria-
tions.92 
 
 83. See, e.g., Colo. Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508, 520–23 (Colo. 
1985); Goldston v. State, 683 S.E.2d 237, 249 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009); State ex rel. 
Condon v. Hodges, 562 S.E.2d 623, 630–31 (S.C. 2002). 
 84. See Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 736 P.2d at 1143 (noting that the stat-
ute failed to set forth “principles, intelligible or otherwise, to guide the execu-
tive”); Chiles, 589 So. 2d at 265 n.7 (Overton, J., concurring) (asserting that 
the statute delegated “unlimited legislative policy-making discretion” to the 
governor and cabinet); Schwartz, 907 P.2d at 1004 (finding the statute “lacked 
sufficient standards” to allow the governor to decrease allotments). 
 85. Chiles, 589 So. 2d at 268. 
 86. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 736 P.2d at 1143. 
 87. Schwartz, 907 P.2d at 1007. 
 88. Id. at 1008. 
 89. Cnty. of Oneida v. Berle, 404 N.E.2d 133, 135–36 (N.Y. 1980) 
(per curiam).  
 90. Id. at 137. 
 91. See Schwartz, 907 P.2d at 1007. 
 92. See Cnty. of Oneida, 404 N.E.2d at 137. 
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In Brayton v. Pawlenty, Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty 
signed into law appropriations in excess of his budget proposal 
and vetoed tax legislation. He purportedly intended to set in 
motion an unallotment scheme on the first day of the fiscal 
year.93 Rather than address the constitutional question, howev-
er, the court in Brayton ruled on whether the unallotments con-
formed to the statute’s procedural elements.94 The court ex-
plained that unallotment is a mechanism to cure 
“unanticipated deficits,”95 not a “weapon” to be used by the gov-
ernor to circumvent the legislative process.96 Since a balanced 
budget is a prerequisite to unallotment, the court voided Gov-
ernor Pawlenty’s unallotments.97 Although Brayton is now set-
tled law, it appears to be merely one of the first waves in a sea 
of future unallotments. 
D. INCREASING EXECUTIVE BRANCH APPROPRIATION 
REDUCTIONS DURING THE RECESSION 
As the United States languishes in the worst recession 
since the Great Depression, states continue to brave the eco-
nomic plight.98 Unfortunately, public revenue continues to de-
preciate; states expect budget deficits though 2012.99 Present 
legislative action has been unsuccessful in securing long-term 
balanced budgets.100 Recently, an unprecedented number of 
governors have taken the unilateral action of unallotment.101 In 
light of these recent events, those affected by the budget cuts 
have increasingly questioned the legal validity of the unallot-
ment process.102 
 
 93. Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 359–61 (Minn. 2010). 
 94. See id. at 363. 
 95. Id. at 367. 
 96. Id. at 362. 
 97. Id. at 368. 
 98. See McNichol et al., supra note 18, at 3. 
 99. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE BUDGET UPDATE: 
JULY 2010 (PRELIMINARY REPORT) 5–6, 13 (2010). 
 100. See id. at 5–14 (noting that deficits continue to prevail). 
 101. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE BUDGET 
UPDATE: NOVEMBER 2009, at 16–18 (2009); Actions and Proposals to Balance 
FY 2011 Budgets, supra note 19. 
 102. See, e.g., Ariz. Ass’n of Providers for Persons with Disabilities v. State, 
219 P.3d 216, 226 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009); Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 359; In re Fis-
cal Year 2010 Judicial Branch Appropriations, 27 So. 3d 394, 395–96 (Miss. 
2010); N.H. Health Care Ass’n v. Lynch, No. 09-E-214, 2009 WL 2364094, at 
*1 (N.H. Super. Ct. June 30, 2009); Perth Amboy Bd. of Educ. v. Christie, 997 
A.2d 262, 262 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (per curiam); Conn. Op. Att’y 
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With a probable increase in executive branch appropriation 
reductions in the future, this Note analyzes the temporal limi-
tations and delegation standards necessary for a constitutional 
unallotment law. In so doing, Part II builds upon Brayton in 
order to dissect the legal and policy implications of aggressive 
executive unallotments. 
II.  UNALLOTMENT’S TEMPORAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS   
This Part expands upon Brayton to construct a foundation 
for examining both the procedural and substantive scope of un-
alloting. For three primary reasons, Brayton is a more appro-
priate vehicle to clarify the dissatisfaction with unallotment 
than a superficial national survey. First, the case was unique 
because it called into question both the procedural and sub-
stantive limits of unallotment.103 Second, Minnesota’s nondele-
gation doctrine parallels a significant number of its peers.104 
Third, Minnesota’s unallotment statute exhibits the two flaws 
found in many statutes—failure to discernibly articulate tem-
poral limitations105 and delegation of discretionary power to re-
duce appropriations.106 In the sphere of unallotment, the broad 
legal and policy issues seen in Brayton transcend state lines. 
The first section revisits Brayton in order to define the 
temporal limitations and procedural scope of unallotment. The 
 
Gen. No. 2009-011, 2009 WL 3406965, at *1 (Oct. 20, 2009); Kan. Op. Att’y 
Gen. No. 2009-16, 2009 WL 2356270, at *1 (July 29, 2009). 
 103. See Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 359–63. 
 104. See Rossi, Institutional Design, supra note 48, at 1191–201, 1223 
(stating that most states require “at a minimum, some legislative statement of 
policy”). 
 105. Compare MINN. STAT. § 16A.152 subdiv. 4(a) (2008) (“If the commis-
sioner determines that probable receipts for the general fund will be less than 
anticipated . . . .”), with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:75(C) (2009) (“Upon receiv-
ing notification that a projected deficit exists . . . .”), and TEX. GOV’T CODE 
ANN. § 317.002 (West 2009) (“After finding that an emergency exists . . . .”). 
 106. See GOSLING, supra note 15, at 10 (asserting that most legislatures 
“delegate some of their authority [over the budget] to the executive branch”). 
Compare MINN. STAT. § 16A.152 subdiv. 4(b) (2008) (“An additional deficit 
shall, with the approval of the governor . . . be made up by reducing unex-
pended allotments . . . .”), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27B-26 (West 2010) 
(“[T]he commissioner, on order of the governor, shall have the power to revise 
the quarterly allotments.”), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 126.05 (West 2010) 
(“[T]he governor may declare a fiscal emergency and may issue such orders as 
necessary . . . to reduce expenditures . . . .”), and W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11B-2-21 
(LexisNexis 2005) (“[The governor] may instruct the secretary to reduce all 
appropriations out of general revenue . . . as necessary . . . .”).  
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second section analyzes and settles the dispute over the proper 
nondelegation standard for unallotments. The final section 
scrutinizes Governor Pawlenty’s expansive utilization of Min-
nesota’s unallotment statute. The following three sections are 
not merely an analysis of unalloting in Minnesota but a foun-
dation for highlighting the respective procedural, constitution-
al, and public-policy shortcomings representative in discretion-
ary executive branch appropriation reductions. 
A. DEFINING UNALLOTMENT’S TEMPORAL LIMITATIONS 
Unallotment challenges often entail the delegation of legis-
lative authority. The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, re-
cently engaged in a statutory-interpretation analysis to eluci-
date the ambiguous time frame in which a governor can 
unallot.107 This section builds upon Brayton and juxtaposes the 
court’s holding with prior executive branch appropriation re-
duction cases that both refute and corroborate the decision.  
1. Brayton Revisited 
The central issue in Brayton was the disputed nature of 
the statute’s temporal language: that the executive branch 
must determine that “probable receipts for the general fund 
will be less than anticipated, and that the amount available for 
the remainder of the biennium will be less than needed” before 
unalloting.108 The governor proposed that this language author-
ized unalloting at any moment in time, even before the bien-
nium commenced.109 The plaintiffs challenged the governor’s 
assertion, contending that the statute only applied to unantici-
pated budget crises.110 After grappling with the parties’ dissen-
sion, the court found the statute ambiguous for failing to make 
clear exactly when the governor should first anticipate receipts 
and for failing to define the purpose for which the government 
needs the revenue.111 To resolve the ambiguity, the court con-
cluded that the drafters’ intent was not to facilitate a prospec-
tive budget-balancing mechanism, but rather to create a meth-
 
 107. See Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 362–68. 
 108. Id. at 360 (citing § 16A.152 subdiv. 4(a)). 
 109. Id. at 362; see also Peter Nelson, In Oral Arguments, Justice Gildea 
Hinted at Another Interpretation of the Unallotment Statute, CENTER AM. 
EXPERIMENT (Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.americanexperiment.org/publications/ 
2010/20100326nelson.php (arguing that unallotment is permissible any time a 
projected budget deficit exists). 
 110. Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 363. 
 111. See id. at 363–64. 
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od to “address unanticipated deficits” arising subsequent to the 
enactment of a budget.112 In other words, the governor’s prema-
ture unallotments evaded the “constitutionally prescribed 
[budget] process.”113 The court further clarified the statute by 
announcing that the value of anticipated receipts “appeared to 
be adequate to fund” the appropriations in the enacted budg-
et.114 The result was that the unallotments were void, in part 
due to the governor’s tax increase veto that prevented the 
enactment of a balanced budget.115 But what if the budget was 
balanced? 
2. Parsing Through Further Textual Ambiguities 
The Minnesota Supreme Court made an ambitious effort to 
define the pivotal unallotment phrases “less than anticipated” 
and “remainder of the biennium.”116 Where a balanced budget 
exists, the court’s opinion does little to prevent unalloting at 
the very beginning of a biennium, however. The time frame to 
unallot principally arises upon the executive’s expectation that 
projected revenues will be, at some point in the future, less 
than anticipated.117 Essentially, governors can sign appropria-
tions into law and unallot upon the belief that a future reces-
sion will put the state’s budget into deficiency. 
This textual ambiguity exists in the seemingly harmless 
word “will,” which frustrates the policy behind unallotment.118 
For example, governors need not establish that revenue has al-
ready become less than anticipated. Instead, they must estab-
lish only that revenue will be less than anticipated in future 
 
 112. Id. at 366–67. 
 113. Id. at 367. 
 114. Id. at 368. 
 115. See id. at 361, 368; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 109 
S.E.2d 552, 562 (W. Va. 1959) (suggesting that unallotment would be improper 
where the state enacts an unbalanced budget). 
 116. See Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 363–64, 368. 
 117. MINN. STAT. § 16A.152 subdiv. 4(a) (2008); see, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 33.290 (West 2001); N.H. STAT. ANN. § 9:16-b (LexisNexis 2008); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 126:05 (West 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 16.50(7) (West 2009). But 
see State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. v. Rockefeller, 281 S.E.2d 131, 135 (W. Va. 1981) 
(holding that the executive has the burden of persuasion in proving that a 
probable budget deficiency necessitates unalloting). 
 118. See Bardsley v. Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 870 P.2d 641, 646 (Colo. 
App. 1994) (noting that the purpose of unallotment is to “allow the governor to 
act on the basis of immediacy”). 
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months or perhaps years.119 It remains uncertain if a governor 
would employ this expansive, but plausible, interpretation. It 
would be an arresting act of power, but perhaps not much 
greater than that seen in Minnesota. Because state judiciaries 
construe the plain meaning of statutes,120 this interpretation 
may persist. In at least three states with the same statutory 
language as Minnesota—Arkansas, Hawaii, and Indiana121—
legal challenges have been less than helpful in explicating 
these concerns.122 Furthermore, precedent from other jurisdic-
tions calls Brayton’s progeny into question.  
3. Juxtaposing Brayton with Precedent 
In Brayton, the court rightfully hesitated to rely on 
precedent from outside Minnesota.123 The following two cases 
provide factual circumstances similar to Brayton but arrive at 
inconsistent rulings. Of the utmost importance in discussing 
these cases is acknowledging the courts’ divergent treatment of 
unallotments by governors. 
In Gilligan, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that whatever 
unallotment’s purpose, governors could reduce appropriations 
even before the legislature enacts them into law.124 The statute 
authorized unalloting upon the governor’s determination that 
revenue “will in all probability be less than the appropriations 
for” the fiscal year.125 Gilligan’s acceptance of gubernatorial 
appropriation reductions in the absence of an enacted budget 
appears to support the procedural validity of Governor Pawlen-
 
 119. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 1668 (2002); MASS. ANN. LAWS 
ch. 29, § 9B (LexisNexis 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 18.1391 (West 
2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-104-13(1) (2009). 
 120. See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 22, at 763–64. 
 121. Compare § 16A.152 subdiv. 4(a) (stating that “probable receipts 
. . . will be less than anticipated” and the “amount available for the remainder 
of the biennium will be less than needed”), HAW. REV. STAT. § 37-37(a) (2009) 
(same), and IND. CODE ANN. § 4 -13-2-18(f ) (LexisNexis 2010) (same), with 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-4-608(4) (2010) (stating that “estimated revenues 
. . . will be less than was anticipated” and “the funds available for the re-
mainder of the fiscal year will be less than the amount estimated”). 
 122. See Mottl v. Miyahira, 23 P.3d 716 (Haw. 2001); Bd. of Educ. v. Wai-
hee, 768 P.2d 1279 (Haw. 1989); Etherton v. Wyatt, 293 N.E.2d 43 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1973). 
 123. Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 367 n.5 (Minn. 2010). 
 124. See Bd. of Educ. v. Gilligan, 301 N.E.2d 911, 913 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973), 
aff’d on other grounds, 311 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 1974). 
 125. Id. at 914 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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ty’s comparable unallotments. Such an unforeseen application 
of the statute,126 however, demands statutory revision. 
Alternatively, the New York Court of Appeals in County of 
Oneida held that former Governor Hugh Carey violated his 
constitutional duty to “take care that [the laws be] faithfully 
executed” when he impounded appropriations directly after 
signing them into law.127 Much like Governor Pawlenty, Gover-
nor Carey signed into law specific appropriations exceeding 
those in his budget proposal rather than exercising his line-
item veto.128 The governor, shortly after the fiscal year com-
menced, impounded those exact appropriations to ensure the 
state budget had a positive balance.129 If the Minnesota Su-
preme Court adhered to the same line of reasoning, Governor 
Pawlenty’s application of the unallotment statute would have 
violated the state constitution.130  
It is well documented that judiciaries defer to executive in-
terpretations of ambiguous statutes, at least in federal court.131 
Extensive deference, however, is counterintuitive within a doc-
trinal scheme that purports to require guiding standards for 
administrative action.132 One author has recognized that stat-
utes that delegate emergency decisionmaking authority not on-
ly engender ambiguous interpretations respecting their tem-
poral and discretionary limitations, but also face further 
questions of constitutionality.133 Appropriately, the next section 
confirms that the nondelegation doctrine prohibits unbridled 
executive discretion during the unallotment process. 
 
 126. Id. at 915 (acknowledging that the legislature likely did not intend to 
allow the governor to make “selective and discriminatory cuts in state programs 
to force the legislature into concurrence with the fiscal policies of the executive”). 
 127. Cnty. Of Oneida v. Berle, 404 N.E.2d 133, 137 (N.Y. 1980) (per cur-
iam) (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 3). 
 128. See id. at 133–35. 
 129. Id. at 135–36. 
 130. See MINN. CONST. art. V, § 3 (noting that the governor “shall take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed”). 
 131. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842–44 (1984). 
 132. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 
330–31 (2000) (“Executive interpretation of a vague statute is not enough 
when the purpose of the [nondelegation doctrine] . . . is to require Congress to 
make its instructions clear.”).  
 133. See Rossi, Lawmaking in Crisis, supra note 20, at 274. 
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B. ESTABLISHING THE NONDELEGATION STANDARD 
State legislatures, in accordance with their respective con-
stitutions, determine how, when, and for what purposes the ex-
ecutive branch shall apply public funds for government admin-
istration.134 The critical unallotment question remains the 
extent to which a legislature may delegate this power, if at all. 
In order to formulate unallotment’s proper nondelegation 
standard, one must resolve three debated issues: which branch 
is obligated to balance the budget, what power an unallotment 
statute delegates to the executive, and the extent to which a 
legislature may delegate the appropriations power. This section 
attempts to answer these questions. 
The first inquiry is whether constitutions entrust the legis-
lature or the executive branch with budget-balancing responsi-
bility. Legislatures must enact a balanced budget in thirty-
seven states.135 Thus, many states hold the legislature account-
able for equating receipts and expenditures.136 Yet in so doing 
states ignore the oscillation of anticipated receipts, which often 
fall below baseline, thereby affirming the inconsequentiality of 
the legislature’s budget implementation by fiscal period’s end. 
Irrespective of this legislative action, the majority of state con-
stitutions mandate a balanced budget at the close of the fiscal 
period.137 Budget balancing, therefore, demands continued en-
forcement.138 Since governors retain the spending power, it is a 
gubernatorial responsibility to ensure a balanced budget exists 
while taking into consideration prior legislative appropria-
tions.139 This is not to suggest, however, that legislatures can-
not reduce appropriations to place the state’s budget into equi-
 
 134. JEFFREY M. ELLIOT, THE STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT POLITICAL 
DICTIONARY 93 (1988). 
 135. Poterba & Rueben, supra note 50, at 191. 
 136. See Coenen, supra note 29, at 1781 n.872. 
 137. One report argues that although few constitutions explicitly require a 
year-end balance, thirty-nine states interpret their constitutions as such. U.S. 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 52, at 16–17. 
 138. See Norman R. Williams, Executive Review in the Fragmented Execu-
tive: State Constitutionalism and Same-Sex Marriage, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 565, 
639 (2006) (confirming that all governors must faithfully execute the laws of 
their state). 
 139. Cf. Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1382 
(1988) (explaining that in the federal government, “the underlying substantive 
legislation creating the entitlement or authorizing the executive branch to in-
cur the obligation . . . constitutes the ultimate source of spending authority”). 
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librium,140 but simply that the legal responsibility lies with the 
governor, especially when the legislature has adjourned. This 
executive authority cannot be plenary, and may actually re-
quire legislative authorization, because executive budget cuts 
infringe upon the legislature’s constitutional power of appropri-
ations. 
Answering the second inquiry is a more arduous task. The 
question is whether unallotment is a delegation of emergency 
budget balancing or of reducing appropriations. State judiciar-
ies have lacked harmonization in their answers.141 The grava-
men of unallotment statutes is that they assist governors in 
balancing budgets during emergencies,142 but its effect is un-
mistakably one of altering appropriations. The idea that state 
constitutions endow the executive branch with budget-
balancing accountability implies that the legislature cannot 
delegate the very same thing. Unallotment statutes, therefore, 
necessarily prescribe the manner in which the executive branch 
is to balance the budget. Thus, the power to reduce appropria-
tions is a delegated means to achieve this end, and not vice ver-
sa. 
Several constitutional law professors recently insinuated 
that budget balancing is, in fact, a gubernatorial responsibility. 
Accordingly, scrutinizing unallotment statutes as a legislative 
encroachment of executive power is unavoidable.143 The profes-
sors erroneously rely on an influential Supreme Court case, 
Bowsher v. Synar,144 and argue that the discretion to reduce 
appropriations is an executive power.145 If correct, unallotment 
 
 140. Vermont’s unallotment statute addresses this argument. See VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 704(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009). 
 141. Compare, e.g., State v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 736 P.2d 1140, 
1142–43 (Alaska 1987) (per curiam), with, e.g., New Eng. Div. of Am. Cancer 
Soc’y v. Comm’r of Admin., 769 N.E.2d 1248, 1257 (Mass. 2002). 
 142. See, e.g., Bardsley v. Colo. Dep’t. of Pub. Safety, 870 P.2d 641, 646 
(Colo. App. 1994); Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 367 (Minn. 2010). 
 143. See Brief of Amici Curiae of Professors of Constitutional Law and Sep-
aration of Powers at 5, 7, Brayton, 781 N.W.2d 357 (No. A10-64) [hereinafter 
Brief of Professors of Constitutional Law] (arguing that legislative oversight of 
executive expenditures “risks unconstitutionally intruding on the powers of 
the executive branch”). But see Legislative Research Comm’n ex rel. Prather v. 
Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 926 (Ky. 1984) (holding that unallotment statutes do 
not constitute “administration of the budget,” but are simply laws that the ex-
ecutive must enforce). 
 144. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
 145. Brief of Professors of Constitutional Law, supra note 143, at 8–11. 
Contra Abbey v. Rowland, 359 F. Supp. 2d 94, 99–100 (D. Conn. 2005) (holding 
that a governor’s discretionary budget cuts are a legislative function). The is-
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statutes are unconstitutional because they encroach upon the 
executive’s budget-balancing domain.146 Therefore, unalloting 
would be invalid if executed under the statute.147 More persua-
sive are the professors’ acknowledgments of the statute’s limit-
ing specifications: setting forth temporal standards, suggesting 
initial sources of unalloting, requiring legislative consultation, 
and arguing that the legislature may override unallotments.148 
But ambiguous temporal limitations, permissive suggestions, 
mere legislative consultation, and the legislature’s capacity to 
override unallotments months after the reductions do nothing 
to restrain executive discretion. Governor Pawlenty’s unallot-
ments are more than enough to prove this.149 
As previously argued, budget balancing is an exercise of 
the executive branch’s spending authority; nevertheless, it can-
not be exclusive or it would permit the governor’s partial usur-
pation of the appropriations power.150 Accordingly, the third 
inquiry ponders the degree to which the legislature can dele-
gate control over appropriations. Legislatures can never dele-
gate their exclusive appropriations power because it is a consti-
tutionally derived source of lawmaking.151 In circumstances 
concerning unallotment, the legislature already set the maxi-
mum appropriations level to ensure that legislative intent is 
fulfilled.152 It naturally follows that the legislature must prom-
 
sue in Bowsher was whether Congress could both write and execute a budget 
reduction statute. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733–34. State legislatures, on the 
other hand, do not write and execute unallotment statutes. 
 146. Henry L. Chambers, Jr. & Dennis E. Logue, Jr., Separation of Powers 
and the 1995-1996 Budget Impasse, 16 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 51, 82 (1996) 
(“If making budget cuts is an exercise of executive power, passing legislation re-
garding budget cuts could be deemed as violative of separation of powers . . . .”). 
 147. Id.  
 148. Brief for Professors of Constitutional Law, supra note 143, at 15–18; 
see also Rossi, Lawmaking in Crisis, supra note 20, at 264 (“[A] presumption of 
state executive lawmaking recognizes that spending decisions during a crisis 
may be made by the executive, subject to legislative ratification or override.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 149. See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae for Minnesota House of Repre-
sentatives, Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 2010) (No. A10-64) 
(indicating the legislature’s disapproval of the governor’s unallotments). 
 150. See State ex rel. Schwartz v. Johnson, 907 P.2d 1001, 1006 (N.M. 
1995) (holding that the “power to reduce appropriations . . . is a legislative 
function” (quoting Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260, 265 
(Fla. 1991))). 
 151. See Rosen, supra note 32, at 134–39. 
 152. See, e.g., Rios v. Symington, 833 P.2d 20, 29 (Ariz. 1992); Colo. Gen. 
Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508, 520, 522 (Colo. 1985); Op. of the Justices to 
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ulgate guiding unallotment standards so that the executive 
does not contravene its intent.153 
State judiciaries revere the nondelegation doctrine much 
more than federal courts.154 Indeed, several justifications exist 
for enhancing an unallotment nondelegation standard. While 
the doctrine’s central tenet is to “limit executive discretion,”155 
many unallotment laws have failed to reflect this maxim.156 
The limited institutional capacity of state legislatures, as com-
pared to that of Congress, necessitates a stronger judicial re-
view of delegated duties.157 Accordingly, when a legislative del-
egation involves the purse strings, state judiciaries must be 
much more cognizant of a separation of powers violation.158 
Due to the legislature’s failure to preserve the scope and pur-
pose of its appropriations, Minnesota’s unallotment statute159 
and those similarly situated160 are unconstitutional. The follow-
 
the Senate, 376 N.E.2d 1217, 1223 (Mass. 1978); Island Cnty. Comm. on As-
sessment Ratios v. Dep’t of Revenue, 500 P.2d 756, 763 (Wash. 1972). 
 153. See, e.g., Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 44 (1975) (prohibiting 
presidential impoundment); Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of Detroit, 537 
N.W.2d 436, 440 (Mich. 1995) (prohibiting mayoral impoundment); Cnty. of 
Oneida v. Berle, 404 N.E.2d 133, 137 (N.Y. 1980) (per curiam) (prohibiting gu-
bernatorial impoundment); Thomas P. Lauth & Paula E. Steinbauer, Budget-
ing in State Government: Control and Management, in HANDBOOK OF STATE 
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION 155, 166–67 (John J. Gargan ed., 2000) 
(“Budget offices can also limit the amount of revenue allotments to agencies” 
but should “adher[e] . . . to legislative intent as expressed in the appropria-
tions act . . . .”). 
 154. Rossi, Dual Constitutions, supra note 57, at 1359. 
 155. Sunstein, supra note 132, at 318. 
 156. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-2-102(4) (West 2010); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 29, §§ 9B–9C (West 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 353.225 (LexisNexis 2009). 
 157. See James E. Westbrook, The Use of the Nondelegation Doctrine in 
Public Sector Labor Law, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 331, 363 (1986). 
 158. See Woodrow E. Turner, Note, The New Post 9/11 America or the 
Making of King George: A Review of Executive Power in the Effort to Combat 
Global Terrorism as It Relates to the Power of the Purse, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 
445, 479 (2004) (arguing for a stronger nondelegation doctrine to prohibit the 
legislature from delegating the power of the purse); cf. Harold J. Krent, Dele-
gation and Its Discontents, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 711 (1994) (reviewing 
DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993)) (“[I]ndividual 
jurists at times joined the chorus of those condemning delegation of policy-
making authority . . . .”). 
 159. MINN. STAT. § 16A.152 subdiv. 4(b) (2008) (“Notwithstanding any oth-
er law to the contrary, the commissioner is empowered to defer or suspend 
prior statutorily created obligations . . . .”). 
 160. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-3722 (2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11B-
2-21 (West 2010). 
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ing section bridges the gap between the nondelegation doctrine 
and unallotment’s policy shortcomings. 
C. DISCRETIONARY UNALLOTING JEOPARDIZES DEMOCRACY 
If legal underpinnings were not reason enough for unal-
lotment reform, then policy justifications surely suffice. The act 
of unalloting does, in fact, authorize gubernatorial lawmaking. 
This section discusses this problematic policy ramification im-
plicit in executive branch appropriation reductions. 
The quintessential illustration of unallotment’s ultimate 
shortcoming is the executive’s unchecked authority to unilater-
ally change substantive law vis-à-vis the modification of statu-
tory language.161 In Minnesota, this arrogation of power in-
cluded the governor’s complete elimination of a special diet 
program,162 reduction of a property tax rebate program,163 and 
reduction of hours for which personal care attendants could re-
ceive monthly public payments.164 The state legislature, of 
course, created each of these programs by law. The latter two 
instances confirm unallotment’s expanding role in Minnesota. 
Governor Pawlenty, in his budget proposal, requested that the 
legislature decrease the statutory value of “rent attributable to 
property taxes”—a formulaic value used to refund renters 
whose rents are high relative to their incomes—from nineteen 
to fifteen percent.165 After consideration, the legislature passed 
on the recommendation.166 Nonetheless, when the legislative 
session ended, the governor used unallotment to redraft the 
statutory language from nineteen to fifteen percent.167 During 
the same session, the legislature redrafted the language of a 
statute that capped public payments to personal care assistants 
 
 161. Compare, e.g., Baker v. Fletcher, 204 S.W.3d 589, 593 (Ky. 2006) (in-
validating unallotment), with, e.g., Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps. v. 
Olson, 338 N.W.2d 97, 103 (N.D. 1983) (upholding unallotment). 
 162. Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 358–59 (Minn. 2010). 
 163. See MINN. MGMT. & BUDGET DEP’T, supra note 9, at 2. 
 164. See id. at 4. 
 165. See Tax Policy, Aids and Credits, ST. MINN., 18 (Jan. 27, 2009), http:// 
www.mmb.state.mn.us/doc/budget/narratives/gov09/tax-policy.pdf. This docu-
ment is part of a larger collection of recommendations from the governor. See 
MINN. MGMT. & BUDGET DEP’T, AGENCY LEVEL NARRATIVES INCLUDING 
GOVERNOR’S RECOMMENDATIONS FISCAL DATA 1/27/2009 (2009), available at 
http://www.doer.state.mn.us/gov-bud-10. 
 166. See MINN. STAT. § 290A.03 subdiv. 11 (2009) (reflecting the current 
statutory rate for “[r]ent constituting property taxes” as nineteen percent). 
 167. See MINN. MGMT. & BUDGET DEP’T, supra note 9, at 2. 
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at 310 hours of service per month.168 The governor signed the 
new provision into law, only to further reduce it to 275 hours 
after the legislative session ended.169 Before the decision in 
Brayton, which merely overturned the unallotments on proce-
dural grounds,170 the governor eliminated at least seven legis-
latively established programs171 and altered the language of 
multiple statutes in the areas of education, health care, and lo-
cal government aid.172 
With respect to similar instances of gubernatorial lawmak-
ing, however, what appears overtly unconstitutional is not as 
conclusive as it may appear.173 More important is that unallot-
ing in this manner raises legitimacy issues with the state’s con-
stituency.174 In one-half of a century, Minnesota governors em-
ployed the unallotment power only twice, each time unalloting 
 
 168. See MINN. STAT. § 256B.0659 subdiv. 11(a)(10) (2009). 
 169. See MINN. MGMT. & BUDGET DEP’T, supra note 9, at 4. 
 170. See Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 363–68 (Minn. 2010). 
 171. See FISCAL ANALYSIS DEP’T, MINN. H.R., GOVERNOR’S FY 2010–11 
UNALLOTMENT AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS, H. 86, 1st Sess., at 2 tbl.1 
(2009), available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/fiscal/files/09unallotsum 
.pdf (noting the elimination of various grants and other funding programs). 
 172. See id. at 6–20. 
 173. Compare, e.g., Baker v. Fletcher, 204 S.W.3d 589, 591–93 (Ky. 2006) 
(reversing the governor’s reduction of a statutorily based five percent salary 
increase for state employees to 2.7 percent because the action was “‘antitheti-
cal to the [executive’s] constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed’” (quoting Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 852, 872 (Ky. 
2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted))), State of Nev. Emps. 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Daines, 824 P.2d 276, 277, 279–80 (Nev. 1992) (per curiam) 
(holding that the executive branch could not unallot a statutorily based four 
percent wage increase to state employees because it would “essentially re-
write” the statute), and Weaver v. Evans, 495 P.2d 639, 649 (Wash. 1972) 
(finding that the legislature did not intend to allow the governor to use unal-
lotment to “modify the legislative provision of a systematic funding program,” 
as doing so would “defeat the legislative purpose” of such provisions), with, 
e.g., Abramson v. Hard, 155 So. 590, 597 (Ala. 1934) (stating that allotment 
reductions could apply to appropriations “fixed” in statute if authorized by 
law), Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps. v. Olson, 338 N.W.2d 97, 100, 
103 (N.D. 1983) (upholding the governor’s reduction of a statutorily based 
state employee salary increase from eight percent to four percent in light of an 
expected budget deficit because an appropriation is merely an authorization to 
spend), and Kan. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2009-16, 2009 WL 2356270, at *2 (July 
29, 2009) (acknowledging that the state’s unallotment statute “authorizes the 
[executive] to suspend . . . statutory obligation[s]” because the legislature, if it 
so chooses, can statutorily exempt programs from unallotment). 
 174. See Duxbury v. Donovan, 138 N.W.2d 692, 696 (Minn. 1965) (“[T]he 
necessary public acceptance of a law is assured more definitely when legisla-
tion opposed by the chief executive has been confirmed by a two-thirds vote of 
both houses.”). 
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across-the-board.175 What was once a device to safeguard finan-
cial stability has become cloying. Since 2003, Governor Pawlen-
ty has unalloted on three separate occasions,176 quickly turning 
the statute into a political tool to abandon appropriations,177 
redraft statutory language,178 and eliminate public pro-
grams.179 The principle that the governor’s “power to see that 
the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be 
a lawmaker”180 cannot be reconciled with unbridled, discretion-
ary unalloting. 
This discussion is not merely an attempt to analyze unal-
loting in Minnesota, but rather an effort to demonstrate the 
manner in which a governor can transcend the lines of separa-
tion of powers through unallotment. Whether it is a matter of 
law or a change in policy, legislatures must begin reform efforts 
so that the executive branch once again exercises unallotment 
not as a political tool, but as a financial safeguard. 
III.  MODEL STATUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT   
In light of the foregoing analysis, this Part develops a mod-
el unallotment statute, which states can implement or refer-
ence while reforming their current law or while proposing new 
legislation.181 In so doing, the model statute synergizes the 
 
 175. See Minn. Fed’n of Teachers v. Quie, No. 447358, slip op. at 2–3 
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 27, 1981) (describing Governor Albert Quie’s 1980 unal-
lotment); ROYCE HANSON, TRIBUNE OF THE PEOPLE: THE MINNESOTA 
LEGISLATURE AND ITS LEADERSHIP 183 (1989) (describing Governor Rudy Per-
pich’s 1985 unallotment). 
 176. See Peter S. Wattson, Legislative History of Unallotment Power, MINN. 
SENATE, 11–13 (June 29, 2009), http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/ 
scr/treatise/unallotment/Unallotment.pdf. 
 177. See Levinson, supra note 13 (discussing Governor Pawlenty’s attempts 
to “slash spending on all sorts of public services”). 
 178. See MINN. MGMT. & BUDGET DEP’T, supra note 9, at 2. 
 179. See Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 361 (Minn. 2010) (discuss-
ing the elimination of payments to one public program). 
 180. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952). 
While the expanding role of the administrative state and its related rulemak-
ing and adjudicatory functions are well known, these lawmaking powers are 
not comparable to amending legislatively created laws through unallotment. 
 181. At least one New York organization is already calling for that state to 
adopt an unallotment statute. See Robert B. Ward, Gubernatorial Powers to 
Address Budget Gaps During the Fiscal Year, NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST. 
GOV’T, 20–22 (June 17, 2010), http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/budgetary_balance_ 
ny/2010-06-17-Gubernatorial_Powers.pdf. 
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foremost elements of existing laws.182 The first section ad-
dresses the necessity of immediate legislative action.183 The 
second section then details the model statute and the variables 
reform-minded legislators must observe. The third section ana-
lyzes the model statute. This Part concludes by proposing al-
ternative avenues to reform. 
A. MODEL STATUTE AS A FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM 
In 1972, a disingenuous act of presidential power184 forced 
Congress to constrain the executive branch’s power to rescind 
appropriations under what one may consider the federal unal-
lotment statute.185 Considering the disquieting incidents in 
Brayton,186 now is the most suitable time for legislatures to 
contemplate reform. The legislative process first afforded the 
executive branch the capacity to prevent budget deficiencies,187 
so it is only appropriate that legislatures invoke the same 
process to curb executive discretion. 
The practicality of adopting the following model statute is 
favorable because it protects legislative power. The judicial sys-
tem, as it has proven, is an ineffective vehicle for reform be-
cause of the uncertainty of litigation,188 the justiciability con-
cerns surrounding unallotment,189 the binding nature of 
 
 182. The author uses unallotment, allotment reduction, and appropriate 
reduction interchangeably. Statutory text, however, must be consistent when 
referring to either allotment reductions or appropriation reductions. 
 183. See, e.g., Joanna M. Myers, Note, When the Governor Legislates: Post-
Enactment Budget Changes and the Separation of Powers in Nevada, 10 NEV. 
L.J. 229, 231–35 (2009) (discussing the recent fiscal crisis precipitating similar 
unallotment issues in Nevada). 
 184. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 40 (1975) (detailing Presi-
dent Nixon’s impoundments). 
 185. See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. 
L. No. 93-344, §§ 1011–1017, 88 Stat. 297, 333–39 (codified as amended at 2 
U.S.C. §§ 682–688 (2006)) (requiring, inter alia, congressional approval of 
presidential budget reductions). 
 186. 781 N.W.2d 357, 361 (Minn. 2010). 
 187. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 37.07.080(g) (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, 
§ 6529 (Michie Supp. 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-104-13(1) (West Supp. 2009). 
 188. Cf. Michael E. Libonati, The Legislative Branch, in 3 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 37, 40 (G. Alan Tarr & Rob-
ert F. Williams eds., 2006) (noting that state courts’ nondelegation doctrine 
jurisprudence is “unpredictable and inconsistent”). 
 189. See, e.g., Mottl v. Miyahira, 23 P.3d 716, 730 (Haw. 2001) (dismissing 
for lack of standing a university faculty members’ suit against the governor 
over unallotment); W. Side Org. Health Servs. Corp. v. Thompson, 404 N.E.2d 
208, 211 (Ill. 1980) (dismissing for mootness a health organization’s suit 
against the governor over impoundment); State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. v. Caper-
  
2011] THE CLOYING USE OF UNALLOTMENT 1097 
 
precedent,190 and the judicial system’s preference to have legis-
latures overturn precedent.191 Even if those courts that uphold 
the constitutionality of discretionary unalloting are correct, leg-
islation is proper as a means of changing policy or closing loop-
holes.  
A governor’s veto power and the shrewd political choices of 
legislators may act as the only barriers to the model statute’s 
adoption. A veto, of course, remains subject to a legislative 
override,192 which may be likely considering some legislators’ 
dissatisfaction with gubernatorial appropriation reductions.193 
As a method of garnering political capital, on the other hand, 
some legislators may value discretionary unalloting as a mech-
anism to both eschew difficult, unpopular budget cuts and to 
blame the executive branch for any consequential public back-
lash. 
Nevertheless, effective reform must account for three var-
iables. First, reform must preserve legislative policy initiatives 
established in appropriations. Second, the model statute must 
enforce retroactive unalloting with a clearly articulated time 
frame, rather than encouraging premature, prospective budget 
reductions. Finally, the model statute must safeguard the ex-
ecutive’s authority to protect solvency when the legislature 
lacks a similar capacity to act.194 The following model statute 
aims to incorporate these three variables.  
B. MODEL UNALLOTMENT STATUTE 
(1)195 The Legislature recognizes that acts of appropria-
tions and their sources of funding reflect the priorities for ex-
 
ton, 441 S.E.2d 373, 376 (W. Va. 1994) (dismissing for mootness a teachers’ 
suit against the governor over unallotment).  
 190. See Yair Listoken, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 
480, 538 (2008) (discussing the judiciary’s reluctance to overturn precedent 
even if it would institute a positive policy change). 
 191. Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 899, 939 (2009). 
 192. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 44, at 1181 (“Legislatures are more in-
clined to challenge gubernatorial budgetary priorities . . . in state budgets.”). 
 193. For example, the plaintiff in the Minnesota unallotment case, Rukavi-
na v. Pawlenty, was a state legislator. 684 N.W.2d 525, 529 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2004). 
 194. See Snell, supra note 23, at 28 (noting the limitations on a legisla-
ture’s power to effectively address budgetary concerns). 
 195. This section borrows heavily from the language of title 32, section 
704(a) of the Vermont Statutes. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 704(a) (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2009). 
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penditures of public funds enacted by the Legislature and that 
major reductions or adjustments, when required by reduced 
state revenues, ought to be made whenever possible by an act 
of the Legislature reflecting its revisions of those priorities. 
Nevertheless, authorized appropriations and their sources of 
funding may be adjusted pursuant to the provisions of this sec-
tion. 
(2) If following the proper enactment of the fiscal year’s 
budget,196 the Governor first discovers that estimated fiscal-
year-end revenues are not sufficient to meet the expenditures 
authorized by the Legislature,197 creating a budget deficit with-
in the current fiscal year,198 the Governor shall reduce the 
budget reserve account to the extent necessary to eliminate the 
budget deficit.199 
(3) Should an additional deficit continue: 
(a) The Governor shall reduce any appropriation in an 
amount not to exceed ten percent200 as specified in subsection 
(3)(b) to the extent necessary to eliminate the budget deficit. If 
the Governor reduces each appropriation by ten percent and 
the budget deficit continues, the Governor shall reduce any ap-
propriations by an additional amount not to exceed five percent 
of the original appropriation as specified in subsection (3)(b) to 
the extent necessary to eliminate the budget deficit. If all ap-
propriations are reduced by fifteen percent and the budget defi-
cit continues, additional reductions shall consist of a uniform 
percentage reduction of all appropriations201 to the extent nec-
essary to eliminate the budget deficit.202 
 
 196. Cf. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 16.50(7)(a) (West 2009) (“If following the enact-
ment of the biennial budget act . . . .”). 
 197. Cf. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 1668 (2002) (“Whenever it appears to 
the [executive] that the anticipated income and other available funds . . . will 
not be sufficient to meet the expenditures authorized by the Legislature . . . .”). 
 198. Cf. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 35-3-8(b) (Supp. 2009) (“[Whenever state agen-
cies are] expected to incur a deficiency within the current fiscal year . . . .”). 
 199. Cf. MINN. STAT. § 16A.152 subdiv. 4(a) (2008) (“[The executive shall] 
reduce the amount in the budget reserve account as needed to balance expend-
itures with revenue.”). 
 200. Cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4 -85(b) (West Supp. 2010) (limiting re-
ductions by three percent of any appropriation). 
 201. Cf. ALA. CODE § 41-4-90 (LexisNexis 2000) (“prorating without dis-
crimination”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 8.31(5) (West 2008) (“uniform and pro-
rated”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 1668 (2002) (“curtail allotments equita-
bly”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-44.1-12 (2008) (“uniform percentage basis”); OK. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 34.49(F) (West 2010) (“in the ratio”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 291.261(2)(a) (West Supp. 2010) (“by the same percentage”); S.C. CODE ANN. 
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(b)203 Prior to directing agencies to reduce appropriations 
as provided in subsection (3)(a), the Governor shall direct each 
agency to analyze the nature of each program that receives a 
general fund appropriation to determine whether the program 
is mandatory or permissive and to analyze the impact of the 
proposed reduction in spending on the legislative purpose of the 
program. An agency shall submit its analysis to the Budget Di-
rector and shall at the same time provide a copy of the analysis 
to the Legislative Fiscal Analyst. The Budget Director shall re-
view each agency’s analysis and shall submit to the Governor 
and Legislative Fiscal Analyst a copy of the Budget Director’s 
recommendations for reductions in spending. The Legislative 
Finance Committee shall meet within fifteen days of the date 
that the proposed changes to the recommendations for reduc-
tions in spending are provided to the Legislative Fiscal Analyst. 
The Legislative Fiscal Analyst shall provide a copy of the Legis-
lative Fiscal Analyst’s review of the proposed reductions in 
spending to the Budget Director at least five days before the 
meeting of the Legislative Finance Committee. The Committee 
may make recommendations concerning the proposed reduc-
tions in spending. The Governor must consider each agency’s 
analysis, the recommendations of the Budget Director, and the 
Legislative Finance Committee in determining the reduction of 
appropriations. The reductions must be designed to have the 
least adverse impact on the provision of services determined to 
be most integral to the discharge of the agency’s statutory re-
sponsibilities204 and must match the recommendations as close-
ly as possible. The Governor shall not reduce appropriations 
under this subsection by a value that exceeds the amount nec-
essary to eliminate the budget deficit.205 
 
§ 1-11-495(A) (2009) (“as uniformly as may be practicable”); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 43.88.110(7) (West 2010) (“across-the-board”). 
 202. Cf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63J-1-217(3)(b) (West Supp. 2010) (directing 
the executive to reduce allotments “by an amount proportionate to the amount 
of the deficiency”). 
 203. This section borrows heavily from the language of section 17-7-
140(1)(b) of the Montana Code. MONT. CODE ANN. § 17-7-140(1)(b) (2009). 
 204. See generally State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. v. Rockefeller, 281 S.E.2d 131 
(W. Va. 1981) (invalidating public education unallotments). 
 205. Cf. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 291.261(2)(b) (West Supp. 2010) (“The de-
partment and the governor may not reduce allotments under this section by a 
total amount that exceeds the amount necessary to bring the total estimated 
General Fund ending balance to zero.”). 
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(4) Nothing in this section shall affect the Legislature’s ca-
pacity to modify appropriations in accordance with legislative 
standards and procedures.206 
(5) Reductions shall not be used to modify, amend, or re-
draft statutory language and shall not apply to unencumbered 
appropriations affecting [any programs the legislature express-
ly exempts].207 
(6) If the deficit conditions of section (2) no longer exist, the 
governor may restore any appropriations previously reduced 
under section (3) up to its original level so long as the restora-
tion will not create an additional budget deficit.208 
C. ANALYSIS 
This statute aims to improve executive branch budget-
balancing mechanisms during fiscal emergencies. Of course, 
each state’s budgetary and legislative processes are statutorily 
crafted in a manner unique to that state. This statute, there-
fore, is not exhaustive in scope. Nor would it be necessary to 
enact every section. Instead, the language stands as a frame-
work for reform.  
In highlighting several specifics, the rest of this section 
seeks to clarify the model statute. 
1. Purpose Clause 
The statutory language begins with a purpose clause. In 
light of this Note’s dedication to explaining the purpose and 
text of unallotment statutes, one might deem a purpose clause 
unnecessary. Courts, however, have substituted the legisla-
ture’s ostensible intent with the executive’s specious plain-
meaning arguments.209 While this clause remains beneficial, 
the following two sections are the most essential. 
 
 206. Cf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63J-1-217(3)(c) (West Supp. 2010) (“The gover-
nor’s directions . . . are rescinded when the Legislature rectifies . . . the Gener-
al Fund budget deficit.”). 
 207. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4 -85(e) (West Supp. 2010) (exempt-
ing aid to municipalities, and legislative and judicial agencies); MD. CODE ANN., 
STATE FIN. & PROC. § 7-213(b) (LexisNexis 2009) (exempting the legislature, 
the judiciary, state debt interest, public schools, salaries of public officers, and 
certain state employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 704(d) (Supp. 2009) (exempt-
ing the legislature, judiciary, debt obligations, and salaries of elected officials). 
 208. Cf. HAW. REV. STAT. § 37-37 (2010) (“The governor at any time by ex-
ecutive order may restore spending authority.”). 
 209. See Bd. of Educ. v. Gilligan, 301 N.E.2d 911, 914–15 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1973) (finding no statutory limitation on the governor’s selective cutbacks de-
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2. Articulating Temporal Limitations 
Section 2 of the model statute serves two purposes. First, it 
clearly states that the governor cannot unallot until after both 
the enactment of a proper budget and the beginning of the fis-
cal year for which the governor determines there is a budget 
deficit. Commanding an executive determination that revenues 
are less than needed, instead of will be less than needed,210 
prohibits premature unalloting based upon the executive’s sus-
picion that revenue will decrease in the future. To further dis-
courage hasty unalloting, the second purpose of section 2 is to 
mandate the drawdown of a budget reserve prior to the execu-
tive’s appropriation reductions. Indeed, a reserve’s purpose is to 
rectify budget shortfalls211 and to alleviate the need for what 
could be economy-killing tax increases during a recession.212 
This section of the model statute may endure criticism for 
two reasons. First, state budgets are contingent upon future 
cash flows, rather than previously acquired revenues.213 At one 
moment in time, a state never has the necessary amount of 
revenue in the treasury to fund the full extent of every appro-
priation. Accordingly, one may note the inconsistency between 
this notion and the model statute because the present value of 
state revenue is always less than enacted appropriations.214 
While this concern proposes factual merit, it deserves greater 
 
spite the “unlikely” chance that the legislature intended to confer such power 
upon him), aff’d on other grounds, 311 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 1974). 
 210. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4 -85(b) (West Supp. 2010) (allow-
ing allotment reductions when revenues “will be insufficient”); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 216.221(5)(a) (West 2010) (providing for unallotment when “a deficit 
will occur”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 37-37(a) (2009) (allowing unallotment when 
revenues “will be less than the amount estimated or allotted therefor”); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 4-13-2-18(f ) (LexisNexis 2002) (same). 
 211. Dick Thornburgh, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and the Balanced Budget 
Amendment: A Page of History, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 611, 616 (1988) (noting 
that the purpose of budget reserves is “to set aside current revenues during good 
times to be used for counter-cyclical purposes during economic retrenchment”). 
 212. See Tom Scheck, Some Cities Warn of Budget Cuts While Sitting on 
Rainy Day Funds, MPR NEWS (Mar. 3, 2009), http://minnesota.publicradio 
.org/display/web/2009/03/02/cityreserves/ (noting a Minnesota state represent-
ative’s call to tap city budget reserves to alleviate the effects of a recession, 
since “[t]his is what budget reserves are for . . . to kind of ride out tough times 
until the economy improves”). 
 213. Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Cor-
porate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 730 n.180 (2002) (“[S]tate budgets are de-
signed to balance short-term cash flows, rather than long-term present values.”). 
 214. See GOSLING, supra note 15, at 5 (describing “revenue constraints that 
are usually tight and a budget heavily committed to the costs of ” salaries and 
benefits). 
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discussion. In Minnesota, Governor Pawlenty justified the ful-
fillment of the statutory conditions upon knowledge that the 
state was “in the midst of a lengthy economic downturn,” mean-
ing that receipts “will be less than anticipated [and] needed.”215 
This would not have been such a laborious standard to satisfy 
had the legislature and the governor balanced the budget prior 
to unalloting.216 
Second, opponents may rightfully question the policy deci-
sion to ignore a growing deficit. However, governments should 
not prematurely unallot because of the uncertainty of oscillat-
ing expenditures and revenues. If nothing else, a one-time, sig-
nificant unallotment at the end of the fiscal period has a higher 
degree of administrative efficiency than multiple unallotments. 
One suggestion to cure this predicament, which is absent from 
the model statute, is to forbid unallotments until the latter half 
of the fiscal year. For states with fiscal bienniums, the statute 
could limit the triggering language to the second year of the bi-
ennium. Alternatively, the statute could authorize unalloting 
only after the legislature adjourns sine die, thereby respecting 
the legislature’s capacity to resolve the deficit. Finally, the stat-
ute could limit the length of any appropriation curtailment to 
only three or four months at a time.217 
3. Delegating the Appropriations Power 
This section of the statute curbs discretionary appropria-
tion reductions. As the statute’s primary delegation clause, sec-
tion 3(a) prohibits arbitrary appropriation-by-appropriation 
unallotments by guiding executive discretion under a three-tier 
unallotment system. The governor, pursuant to the first tier, 
may only reduce an appropriation by up to ten percent. Should 
the state continue to confront a deficit after the governor re-
duces every appropriation by up to ten percent, the statute’s 
second tier will emerge, in which case the governor shall then 
reduce any appropriation by an additional five percent of the 
 
 215. Letter from Tom J. Hanson, Comm’r, Minn. Mgmt. & Budget, to Tim 
Pawlenty, Minn. Governor 1 (June 4, 2009), available at http://minnesota 
.publicradio.org/features/2009/06/04_tscheck_unallot/hansonletter.pdf. 
 216. See Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 368 (Minn. 2010) (“Reading 
the statute to require enactment of a balanced budget as a predicate to the ex-
ercise of unallotment authority provides a definite and logical reference point 
for measuring whether current revenues are ‘less than anticipated.’” (citing 
MINN. STAT. § 16A.152 subdiv. 4 (2010))). 
 217. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-2-102(4) (2009) (limiting suspensions or 
discontinuations of state agencies or services to three-month intervals). 
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original appropriation as needed. A deficit subsequent to the 
governor’s fifteen percent reduction of all appropriations, if one 
exists, requires unallotments on a uniform percentage basis 
until the deficit is disspelled. 
One may contend that the third section would be counter-
productive during excessive budget deficiencies. A provision 
that emphasizes uniformly prorated unallotments appears to 
be inconsistent with the first two tiers, which reduce each per-
missible appropriation by a set percentage.218 Although this is 
true, any deficit in excess of fifteen percent of the general fund 
deserves legislative attention. Section 4 further explores this 
issue. 
Section 3(b), mirroring Montana’s unallotment law,219 at-
tempts to underscore governmental efficiency while still pre-
serving separation of powers. Pursuant to this section, each 
agency drafts a report that analyzes “the impact of the pro-
posed” unallotments on subjected programs.220 An executive 
budget department and a legislative oversight committee, upon 
receiving copies of the report, formulate recommendations.221 
Thereafter, the governor evaluates the reports and recommen-
dations in order to implement unallotments that “have the 
least adverse impact on the provision of services determined to 
be most integral” to each agency.222 In practice, governors 
would unallot appropriations with excess funds, rather than 
from those with insufficient revenues. This method should 
cause minimal inconvenience to affluent agencies while miti-
gating the burden on those with threatened appropriations.223 
Indeed, it remains unnecessary to completely exhaust an ap-
propriation where its purpose, such as completing a construc-
tion project, has been accomplished by expending less than the 
full amount.224 To reach the same end, the model statute could 
 
 218. The statute, of course, could also continue the system of increasing 
percentage caps. 
 219. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 17-7-140 (2009). 
 220. Supra Part III.B.3.b. 
 221. See supra Part III.B.3.b. 
 222. Supra Part III.B.3.b. 
 223. This method benefits states where the executive allots appropriations 
over a long period, in contrast to those with quarterly or monthly allotments 
that more adequately preserve funding throughout the fiscal year. See general-
ly GOSLING, supra note 15, at 10 (noting that allotment periods range from 
monthly or quarterly periods to entire fiscal years). 
 224. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.88.110(9) (West 2009) (“The [ex-
ecutive] may exempt certain public funds . . . if it is not practical or necessary 
to allot the funds.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 16.50(2) (West 2009) (“If the [executive] 
  
1104 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1071 
 
authorize the governor’s transfer of revenue from an affluent 
fund into the general fund,225 but this proposal may face ques-
tions of constitutionality.226 In conclusion, legislatures must 
strongly consider the merits of this model statute’s delegation 
provision. 
Although unlikely to occur, policy-driven executive actors 
may still unallot funding from programs that are inconsistent 
with gubernatorial initiatives.227 Two states in particular have 
created expedited appeal systems that may help to avoid such 
outcomes. Agency directors in Kansas and Idaho may challenge 
gubernatorial budget reductions in front of, respectively, an ex-
ecutive228 or a legislative board.229 Meanwhile, North Dakota’s 
statute sets forth standards for a legislative challenge in the 
judiciary.230 In light of section 3(b)’s ample details, such a pro-
vision would appear extraneous, but nonetheless effective.231 
4. Legislative Override 
Pursuant to section 4, the legislature may override or mod-
ify the executive’s unallotments in a manner more consistent 
with legislative intent. To do so, the legislature must be in ses-
sion and must override the governor’s unallotments in accord-
ance with its standard lawmaking procedures. It may be the 
 
is satisfied that an estimate for any period is more than sufficient[,] . . . he or 
she may modify or withhold approval of the estimate.”). 
 225. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-75-201.5(g) (West 2009) (allowing for 
transfers of excess revenue from a selection of sources to the general fund for 
the fiscal year 2008–2009). 
 226. See, e.g., Goldston v. State, 683 S.E.2d 237, 247–49 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2009) (holding that only the legislature can authorize appropriations transfers 
between funds). 
 227. A governor’s tendency to preserve his or her budgetary priorities, po-
tentially at the expense of conflicting programs, is well established. See DALL 
W. FORSYTHE, MEMOS TO THE GOVERNOR: AN INTRODUCTION TO STATE 
BUDGETING 38 (2d ed. 2004) (“[F]ew governors will sacrifice their own pro-
gram priorities to [unallotment].”); see also Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, 
Malleable Constitutions: Reflections on State Constitutional Reform, 87 TEX. L. 
REV. 1517, 1538–39 (2009) (discussing the contention between legislatures and 
the executive branch over whether governors should be able to unallot). 
 228. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-3722 (1997) (allowing for review by the state 
finance council upon agency request). 
 229. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-3512A (2006) (providing for a hearing be-
fore the state board of examiners upon the request of department heads). 
 230. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-44.1-12.1 (Supp. 2009). 
 231. See generally Stanley H. Friedelbaum, State Courts and the Separation 
of Powers: A Venerable Doctrine in Varied Contexts, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1417, 1452–
57 (1998) (noting that courts seek to find a balance between sufficient guiding 
standards and excessive oversight when considering unallotment statutes). 
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case, however, that the legislature cannot reach a consensus or 
cannot override a veto. Indeed, the existence of unallotment 
statutes is primarily due to these circumstances.232 Still, 
another positive aspect of the state budgeting process is that 
legislatures appropriate new revenue each fiscal year or bien-
nium.233 Therefore, in months’ time, the legislature can reap-
propriate revenue to defunded agencies. 
5. Exempting Appropriations 
Section 5 preserves legislative priorities before the gover-
nor can unallot. This section recognizes the legislature’s compe-
tence to conditionally exempt appropriations from unallotment 
each fiscal period. Understanding the cumbersome and repeti-
tive approach of legislating in this manner, lawmakers could 
include within the statute itself programs, initiatives, or priori-
ties that are repeatedly exempt from unallotment. In other 
words, the legislature can either preserve its policy initiatives 
in each fiscal period’s appropriations act or protect the most 
important funding priorities when reforming its state’s unal-
lotment law. Section 5 further prohibits the kinds of attempted 
gubernatorial lawmaking and statutory modifications that 
have been addressed in several cases.234 
6. Executive Restoration  
This final section authorizes executive action if the deficit 
subsides. Should any positive balance in the state budget occur 
subsequent to the appropriation reductions, the governor can 
reallot appropriations to their respective agencies.235 This reau-
thorization of appropriations would not amount to an unconsti-
tutional delegation of the appropriations power because gover-
 
 232. See Bardsley v. Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 870 P.2d 641, 646 (Colo. 
App. 1994). 
 233. See Ronald Snell, Budgeting, State, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
TAXATION & TAX POLICY, supra note 23, at 28–29 (noting the standard state 
budgeting time frames). 
 234. See, e.g., Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 359–62 (Minn. 2010) 
(describing the governor’s series of vetoes and unallotments); Am. Fed’n of 
State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps. v. Olson, 338 N.W.2d 97, 98–100 (N.D. 1983) (de-
scribing the unallotments affecting legislatively appropriated salary increases 
for state workers). 
 235. Cf. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-3512A (2006) (“The governor at any time by 
executive order may restore spending authority which has been temporarily 
reduced to its original level.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27B-27 (West 2010) (allow-
ing for revisions to quarterly allotments at the executive’s discretion upon ap-
plication by a requesting officer). 
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nors would not be alloting appropriations in excess of their 
original amount. One should be weary, however, of crafty ex-
ecutive actors that may use this provision to cut appropriations 
uniformly only to reauthorize appropriations to programs con-
sistent with gubernatorial initiatives. To prevent this from oc-
curring, Florida’s statute, for instance, forbids gubernatorial 
restoration of unallotments.236 As a matter of policy, states ac-
tually may choose to preserve the enacted budget cuts in order 
to ensure a positive balance on the budget at the end of the fis-
cal year.237 Depending on a state’s aims, such a provision could 
easily be inserted in lieu of section 6 of the model statute. 
The preceding statute integrates unallotment’s most effec-
tive legal standards while adding further provisions to estab-
lish a paradigm for reform. Consistent with the majority of cur-
rent statutes, the model statute respects the executive branch’s 
capability to promulgate discretionary budget reductions. The 
model statute, however, advances several mechanisms that en-
courage unalloting to remain consistent with legislative intent. 
While other legally sound reform alternatives have merit, this 
Note’s model statute is the best option for reform.  
D. ALTERNATIVE AVENUES FOR REFORM 
When developing a model statute, the drafter must be con-
scious of each state’s unique statutory and constitutional provi-
sions. While the foregoing statute is a useful scheme for any 
state to adopt, others may surmise that some alternative is a 
more suitable means for reform. This section briefly proposes 
several reform alternatives—single-tier unallotments, legisla-
tive confirmation, and constitutional reform—and explores the 
merits and inefficiencies of each. 
The first reform alternative is the development of a single-
tier unallotment system, which either caps appropriation re-
ductions at a specific percentage or reduces appropriations in a 
uniform manner. The benefits and disadvantages of capped and 
uniformly prorated unallotments correspond to those addressed 
in the model statute. Percentage cap unallotments permit ex-
ecutive discretion, but in doing so they establish a route to un-
dermine legislative funding priorities. Uniformly prorated un-
 
 236. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 216.221(11) (West 2010). 
 237. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 17-7-140(1)(a) (2009) (requiring spend-
ing to be reduced to “an amount that ensures that the projected ending gener-
al fund balance for the biennium will be at least 1% of all general fund appro-
priations”). 
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allotments prohibit unbridled executive discretion, but this 
comes at the cost of pitting forced budget reductions against 
overextended appropriations and agencies. Deciding between 
the two is, therefore, a matter of cost-benefit analysis. 
The model statute, however, painstakingly accounts for 
both concerns. The first two tiers encourage the executive to 
unallot in a manner consistent with the legislative purpose in-
trinsic in the affected appropriations. Yet, the statute caps the 
executive’s overall discretion to unallot at fifteen percent. 
Above this level, the governor must uniformly prorate unallot-
ments to preserve the legislature’s policymaking authority. Al-
ternatively, other statutes provide legislatures a greater role in 
the unallotment process.238 
States looking to craft statutes that generate a greater leg-
islative presence during unallotment have done so in a variety 
of ways. The executive branch in Vermont has discretion to un-
allot certain appropriations up to five percent, but a legislative 
committee must approve any cuts beyond this level.239 Florida’s 
unallotment statute also provides for discretionary reductions, 
but if the deficit reaches a certain level, the legislature must 
resolve the crisis.240 In Kentucky, the legislature must include 
a “budget reduction plan” in each budget for the executive 
branch to implement.241 Several statutes even require legisla-
tive approval of any unallotment.242 Finally, Wisconsin so 
strictly mandates legislative approval of unallotments that, if 
necessary, governors must call a special session so that legisla-
tors can consider all proposed reductions.243 Along these lines, 
one author encourages a system of legislative checks on execu-
 
 238. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:75(C)(2)(e) (Supp. 2010) (requiring 
approval from a legislative committee before unallotments may take effect); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 35-3-8 (Supp. 2009) (requiring the executive to submit unal-
lotment requests to the general assembly). 
 239. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 704(b)(2) (Supp. 2009); see also CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4 -85(c) (West Supp. 2010) (establishing a similar procedure 
in Connecticut). 
 240. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 216.221(6) (West 2010). 
 241. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48.130(1) (West 2009). 
 242. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 18.1391(3) (West 2004) (subjecting 
unallotment recommendations to majority vote by a legislative committee); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:16-b (2008) (same); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 317.005 
(West 2005) (same). 
 243. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 16.50(7)(b) (West 2009). But cf. Campbell v. White, 
856 P.2d 255, 262 (Okla. 1993) (refusing to issue an opinion that would force a 
special legislative session during a fiscal downturn because the “session would 
be costly and might result in precious resources . . . being expended to support 
the session itself ”). 
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tive budgetary decisions in lieu of “micromanaging” through 
traditional unallotment statutes.244 Unfortunately, a large body 
of case law questions the constitutional validity of a direct leg-
islative presence during the executive’s administration of the 
budget.245 
The final alternative to adoption of the model statute is 
reform through the constitutional amendment process. State 
constitutions that currently address executive branch unallot-
ing promote unfettered discretion that is adverse to public poli-
cy.246 Despite this fact, constitutional reform would dispense of 
all legal questions with respect to unconstitutional delegations 
of legislative power. Still, while this proposal may work for sev-
eral states, the practicality of multistate constitutional reform 
is minimal. Although the lawmaking process is generally con-
sistent from state to state,247 the procedures for constitutional 
amendments deviate substantially.248 In fact, nineteen states 
have yet to even amend their own constitution.249 In conclusion, 
legislation is a much more practical agent for reform than the 
constitutional amendment process. 
These three alternative avenues to reform are all viable op-
tions. Single-tier unallotments, greater legislative involvement, 
and constitutional reform are all more effective solutions than 
the status quo. As feasible as these alternatives are, they each 
lack the practicality and effectiveness of this Note’s model stat-
ute. 
  CONCLUSION   
The heart of unallotment reform does not extend far 
beyond the purview of an introductory civics class: the legisla-
ture creates the law, the executive enforces the law, and the ju-
 
 244. See Rossi, Lawmaking in Crisis, supra note 20, at 274. 
 245. See John Devlin, Toward A State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation 
of Powers: Legislators and Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative 
Functions, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1205, 1251–52 & nn.173–75 (1993) (acknowledg-
ing the mixed constitutional results of legislative finance councils and “similar 
legislative bodies” with quasi-administrative functions). 
 246. See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. IV, § 27 (conferring broad unallotment pow-
ers on the governor); N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5(3) (same). 
 247. Victor B. Flatt, The “Benefits” of Non-Delegation: Using the Non-
Delegation Doctrine to Bring More Rigor to Benefit-Cost Analysis, 15 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1087, 1088 (2007) (“Similar state constitutional doctrines 
underlie state lawmaking.”). 
 248. See Cain & Noll, supra note 227, at 1521–23. 
 249. See id. at 1519. 
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diciary interprets the law. In the age of excessive government 
spending, state legislatures have bestowed upon governors the 
power to reduce appropriations. Perhaps the enticement of ease 
and simplicity are to blame, but as Justice Brandeis famously 
stated, the objective of separation of powers is “not to promote 
efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.”250 
The cloying use of unallotment in Minnesota, one that must not 
spread throughout the United States, should not entirely over-
shadow the procedure’s purpose of solvency sustainment. In-
deed, unallotment laws are an essential fixture within state 
governments. The model statute in this Note presents a prom-
ising means of curbing the executive’s arbitrary discretion to 
reduce appropriations and to amend laws in a fashion inconsis-
tent with legislative intent. The utility of unallotment statutes 
is necessarily limited because they assume financial shortcom-
ings as a prerequisite to act. Thus, one should not see unallot-
ment reform as the end of the debate, but rather as a useful 
procedural mechanism to ensure the protection of legislative 
policy initiatives during budget deficits. 
 
 250. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 85 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
